Lecture 13 Mad, Coffin, and the NutsI.
- The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Film “Thirteen Days”
- Why the Cuban Missile Crisis?
- Bay of Pigs and repeated invasions of Cuba—dominance of the
- Kennedy’s strategic buildup of forces
- The Cuban Missile Crisis was not resolved by America's nuclear superiority
- conventional superiority
- Did US foreign policy makers learn anything?
- Nuclear Superiority is useless against an enemy who can retaliate
- The “eyeball” myth
- The “calibrated brinkmanship” myth
II. MAD, COFFIN, and the NUTS
- What are Nuclear Weapons?
- How many does the US have?
- Implications for Foreign Policy
- Cannot be used to win wars against those who can retaliate
- Numbers do not count
- States cannot provide security for their citizens with nukes
- Purpose of war changes
The MAD policy position: Containment by necessity
- Weapons can only be used for retaliation therefore
- They must be invulnerable to a first strike
- They must be aimed at “soft” targets
- They do not have to be precise
- They cannot defend, or be used for offense: they can only deter
- This is New
- New Fears
- MAD Definition and Significance
- MAD Flaws
- Not credible—a bluff?
- Cannot assure national security
- Vulnerability problems
- Building more weapons destabilizes
- Codifying MAD: The ABM Treaty
- COFFIN: The escape from MAD
- A Hawk strategy advocated by NUTs
- Make Nukes like conventional weapons
- Preemptive nuclear war is necessary
- NAC 68
- Kill hard targets
- Accuracy, speed, readiness, reliability: MARV, MIRV, MK 12, SIG, NAVSTAR,
Cruise Missiles, Stealth Bombers, ASW, ABM, Civil Defense, MX
- COFFIN Flaws
- Destabilizing –First Strike instability. First Strike incentive
- Requires Missile Defense: Likely to be imperfect
- The Dove Strategy
Focuses on flaws of both MAD and COFFIN
- Arms control
- No missile defense