WPJ Summer 97: James Chace, An Empty Hegemony?An Empty Hegemony? James Chace As the twentieth century draws to a close, the nation-state still reigns, despite the globalization of the economy. So long as people look to the state to provide for their security, the nation-state will continue to behave pretty much as it has for the past 350 years. Even if a larger grouping assumes the role of the nation-state—as the European Union is attempting to do—it will doubtless play its historic part in the game of nations. The game, of course, is the balance of power. This simply means that if a state tries to assume too great a place in the society of nations, a hegemonic role if you will, other great powers will combine against it. Today, the United States is by all accounts the greatest power in the world. Henry Luce may well have been wrong when he branded the twentieth century the "American Century." For most of this century, Germany, and later the Soviet Union, vied for supremacy with the United States. The way things are going now, however, the twenty-first century will deserve Luce's appellation. As of mid-May 1997, America enjoys a low rate of inflation, the lowest unemployment rate in a quarter of a century, and excellent economic growth (5.6 percent for the first quarter of this year). The fiscal deficit has fallen to $75 billion, scarcely 1 percent of the gross domestic product. The most threatening cloud on this economic horizon is the interest on the debt accumulated throughout 25 years of profligacy, especially the run-up that took place during the Reagan years. Interest payments on that debt run to $247 billion a year. Moreover, if there is a downturn in the economy some time in the future, these annual quarter-trillion-dollar interest payments will still have to be made. Nonetheless, the American economy is the envy of the world. Buttressed by this booming economy is the defense capability of the United States. With a defense budget for 1998 of some $260 billion, America spends more on defense than all the other industrial nations of the world combined. If this does not render the United States invulnerable, which has been its aspiration for most of its history, then it is hard to imagine what would. Other great powers, however, resent any nation that tries to exert its hegemony over the globe. Former cabinet secretary James Schlesinger was recently quoted as citing "the historic tendency" of the great powers—in this case, China, Russia, and Europe—"to cut a leader down to size." This was singularly evident at a meeting in late April between Russia's president Boris Yeltsin and China's president Jiang Zemin. At a five-day summit in Moscow, the two leaders pledged to work together to limit American power and influence in the world. "No country should seek hegemony, practice power politics, or monopolize international relations," these two powers agreed in a joint statement. Nor are America's allies about to knuckle under to an America-driven world. If the European Union can finally put together a common currency, with a political and defense establishment to match, Europe is bound to challenge American predominance. At this point, it is time to ask exactly what Washington wants to do. What does the Clinton administration see as America's foreign policy goals in light of its great power? In 1992, a Pentagon planning document was leaked to the press; in language intended for the defense mandarinate, the paper argued that the United States must "discourage the advanced industrial nations [that is, Germany and Japan] from challenging our leadership or even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." What is good for America, it seems, is good for the world. In order to fulfill America's obligations in this respect, the United States must "retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing...those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations." When the Pentagon's thinking became public knowledge, the Defense Department planners were ordered to revise the document. But the current defense budget, which the Republicans in Congress would prefer to see even larger, bears out the notion of an American military designed to keep order in the world. "Whereas the American arsenal was once directed primarily against the Soviet Union," Ronald Steel has written, "it would now be directed against everybody. Whereas it was once intended to contain communism, its goal now is nothing less than the containment of global disorder." NATO expansion extends America's interests and commitments, and therefore calls up the possibility of new threats. Washington also continues to pursue a policy of the "double containment" of Iraq and Iran, which it brands rogue states. America used gunboat diplomacy in 1996 to warn the mainland Chinese not to intimidate Taiwan. America proved to be, in Clinton's phrase, "the indispensable nation" in ending the Bosnian conflict. The United States continued to exert military and economic power in Haiti and Mexico respectively, both within its traditional sphere of influence. But to what end is American hegemony intended? Bill Clinton has said that the United States cannot be "simply...another great power." What does this mean in the world today? Is the aim to establish a global balance of power? Richard Nixon suggested in 1971 that he thought it would be "a safer world and a better world if we have a strong United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance." If that is not America's goal, then what is? It is surely up to the president to articulate America's global role beyond the mantra of "the indispensable nation." Precisely because there is no grave crisis bearing down upon the United States, no overwhelming threat to American power and purpose, there is an even greater need than in the past to spell out America's role in the world. It is task that Theodore Roosevelt would have relished: to define the American mission for a new century.